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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When President Reagan honored the “Unknown Soldier” from the Vietnam War 
on Memorial Day in 1984, the remains were added to the Tomb of the Unknowns 
with other unknown soldiers from World Wars I, II, and the Korean War in one of 
the country’s most revered memorials.1  With the development of a new type of 
                                                                
1Steven Lee Meyers, Unknown Vietnam Soldier Now Has a Name, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
1998, at A1. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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genetic test approved for use in 1995, a sample of DNA was removed from the 
remains and matched with the DNA of the mother of First Lieutenant Michael 
Blassie, an Air Force pilot whose jet crashed in a South Vietnam village in 1972.2  
This discovery could mark the end of any further additions to the Tomb, as Pentagon 
officials have already questioned the utility of searching for another unknown, since 
advances in genetic identification could render “unknown” remains a thing of the 
past.3 
Advances in technology, as well as the progress of the Human Genome Project, a 
now multi-faceted race to crack the human genetic code,4 have increased the 
potential applications for the information that can be extracted from human DNA.  
With each new use for the information comes new potential for controversy.  Dispute 
has arisen in the context of evidentiary use,5 paternity testing, and identification, and 
moral and ethical debate has raged concerning various medical and diagnostic 
applications.6  The legal issues raised include privacy, confidentiality, and property 
rights, to name a few.7  The focus of this writing is the use of DNA for identification 
purposes and the issues that arise when genetic traits and/or predisposition to 
physical or mental conditions are linked to the individual specifically,  along with the 
implications of a national DNA database as a system of identification.   
It has become the general rule that it is not an unreasonable invasion of privacy to 
take DNA for the purpose of identifying criminal offenders through a DNA 
database.8  This writing will examine the potential for nonconsensual inclusion of 
                                                                
2Id. 
3Id. 
4What began solely as a federally-funded venture of the Department of Energy (DOE) and 
National Institute of Health (NIH) which was carried out by universities and government 
laboratories in the United States, as well as international facilities, is now competing against 
private projects which have since emerged and announced plans to complete the sequence of 
the human genome ahead of the government’s time schedule.  Michael D. Lemonick and Dick 
Thompson, Racing to Map Our DNA, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 44.   
5Thomas M. Fleming, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84 
A.L.R. 4th 313 (1991). 
6See generally, Charles H. Sanders, Genetic Secrets:  Protecting Privacy and 
Confidentiality in the Genetic Era, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 865 (1998) (book review). 
7Id. 
8See, e.g., Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 520 
(1998); Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 
(10th Cir. 1996); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995); Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 
(4th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Goodridge, 
945 F. Supp. 371 (D. Mass. 1996); Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048 (W.D. Wis. 
1996); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995), aff’d, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 
1996); Vanderlingen v. Kansas, 874 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Kan. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Schlicher v. 
Peters, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996); Sanders v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. N.C. 1994); 
Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993); In re. Appeal in Maricopa 
County Juvenile Action Nos. JV-512600 and JV-512797, 930 P.2d 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); 
Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); People v. King, 232 A.D.2d 111 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1997) appeal denied, 691 N.E.2d 646 (N.Y. 1997); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/8
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nearly everyone into such a system, as well as the ramifications in the areas of 
employment and individual insurance coverage if access to genetic information is not 
controlled.  Current legislative efforts will be explored in an attempt to advocate the 
best direction for future legislation of information that is too vitally useful to 
prohibit, yet too indiscriminately dangerous to leave vulnerable to all who may find 
it useful. 
II.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION:  DNA  AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
The word “DNA” has recently moved from an almost exclusively scientific arena 
to the living rooms and workplaces of society-at-large, so it is helpful, if not 
essential, to have at least a basic understanding of what it is and how it can be used 
as a means of identification.  All living things, from simple bacteria to human beings, 
contain deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) within the nucleus of all their cells.9  In 
humans, the DNA molecule looks like a twisted ladder—two strands made up of a 
sugar and phosphate chain held together by “rungs” which contain pairs of molecules 
called bases.10  The particular order of these bases along the backbone is called the 
DNA sequence, and it is the specific genetic instruction for creating an organism 
with unique traits.11 
Genes are a specific sequence of bases, and there are many genes within each 
DNA molecule which serve as the fundamental units of heredity.12  The complete set 
of instructions for making an organism is called its genome;13 in humans, DNA and 
other protein molecules are packed into chromosomes to make up the complete 
human genome.The human genome is estimated to contain at least 100,000 genes.14  
To put its complexity in perspective, consider the following comparison:  the E.Coli 
bacterium genome is made up of 4.6 million bases.15  The smallest human 
chromosome (the “Y” chromosome) has 50 million bases, the largest has 250 
million, and the entire human genome consists of 3 billion bases.16   
                                                          
of Multnomah County v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Washington v. Olivas, 
856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993). 
9U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Primer on Molecular Genetics, DOE Human Genome 1991-2 
Program Report 6 (June 1992) [hereinafter Primer]. 
10There are only four different bases:  adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine, each of 
which pairs with only one of the others.  Id. at 5. 
11Id. at 6. 
12Id. 
13Id. at 5. 
14Id. at 7. 
15
 Primer, supra note 9, at 7. 
16Id. 
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The Human Genome Project17 is dedicated to determining the complete human 
genetic code.  This involves dividing chromosomes into smaller fragments and 
ordering them to correspond to their location on the genome.18  Then, the base 
sequence of the fragments is determined.  The aim is to find all the genes in the DNA 
sequence and to use this information to create advances in biology and medicine.  In 
fact, the impact of the completion of the project is immense, promising to 
revolutionize medical practice.19  For instance, it will be possible to diagnose 
inherited diseases.  Genes associated with some diseases have already been 
identified.20  I emphasize just how important the results of the Human Genome 
Project are because this paper will indicate potential legal dilemmas and dangers 
arising from the use of this data.21  This is in no way meant to suggest that the 
scientific progress should be halted; rather, it is meant to stress the importance of 
controlling the dangers by identifying and addressing them.  In spite of the new 
problems that will ride the wave of this breakthrough, the benefits outweigh the 
detriment. 
The new plan devised by the Human Genome Project predicts completion of the 
full sequence by the end of 2003, two years ahead of the initial schedule.22  One of 
the goals specifically outlined by the Human Genome Project is making the sequence 
“totally and freely accessible.”23  This presumably refers to the scientific community, 
since public funding of the project is on the basis of public availability to promote an 
environment of shared information for the purpose of stimulating research.24  While 
commendable in the research context, this policy becomes a terrifying thought if 
extended to include the uninhibited publication of hereditary characteristics in 
conjunction with the individual who possesses them.  The Human Genome Project 
acknowledges this concern as well by emphasizing the necessity for anonymity 
concerning studies of individuals whose ancestors come from a wide range of 
geographic areas in order to discover the most common variants possible in all 
human populations.25  In addition, the NIH/DOE have expressed awareness of and 
concern for the social implications inherent in this advance in the understanding of 
                                                                
17See Lemonick and Thompson, supra note 4.  The NIH and DOE reportedly welcome the 
private enterprises, which have stated the intention to periodically release data in a 
collaboration with the public effort.  See also, Francis S. Collins et al., New Goals for the U.S. 
Human Genome Project: 1998-2003, 282 SCIENCE 682, 685 (Oct. 23, 1998). 
18Primer, supra note 9, at 10. 
19Id. at 30. 
20Cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy; genetic susceptibilities have been 
implicated in diabetes, stroke, and several cancers.  Id.  
21The Human Genome Project acknowledges that the use of data from its studies could 
present challenges which should be addressed before a significant amount of data is 
accumulated.  In an effort to assist in this end, the Project is funding conferences and research 
projects in consideration of potential issues and to promote public awareness.  Id. 
22Collins et al., supra note 17, at 682.  
23Id. at 685. 
24Id. 
25Id. at 686. 
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human genetics and have created the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) 
program26 to guide both the conduct of the research and the development of public 
policy.27 
The “ultimate repositories” of data from the Human Genome Project are DNA 
databases,28 but there is another, more controversial compilation of DNA aimed not 
at anonymity, but rather at using DNA to identify criminal offenders.29  The 
controversy is not whether we should use the DNA to catch criminals, but rather who 
else will have access to the information.  This especially becomes a concern if lesser 
offenders (i.e. traffic violators) or innocent individuals are included in the database, 
with the potential for harm in that respect.30  The FBI has opened a national DNA 
database at an undisclosed location in an effort to unify the databases now set up in 
all fifty states, making it possible to compare a DNA sample with samples from 
suspects and crime scenes from all others in the system.31  Recall that DNA can be 
found wherever cells are found,32 including in dead skin cells shed constantly by all 
of us, in blood and sweat.33  Law enforcement officials hope to prevent recidivism 
and more serious crime by nipping the petty criminal in the bud.34   
While the DNA database is new to the U.S., England and Wales established one 
in 1995 which now holds 360,000 entries and has so far matched 28,000 people to 
crime scenes at fifty-five dollars per analysis—a cost effective tool for police 
forces.35  While the police force’s enthusiasm is understandable, a senior police 
officer created a media storm in Britain when he called for inclusion of the whole 
population in the DNA database.36  Because the people currently in the database were 
not asked permission for the samples,37 and the U.S. has followed a similar trend as 
far as felons are concerned, the logical question is one of limits:  what is the minimal 
offense for which we will justify nonconsensual taking of DNA, and does there 
follow from this a natural progression which will justify even nonconsensual taking 
from everyone for the purpose of a criminal database? 
                                                                
26Id. at 687. 
27Collins et al., supra note 17, at 688.  For more goals of ELSI research, see 
www.nhgri.nih.gov/98plan/elsi/. 
28Id. at 688. 
29Nicholas Wade, FBI to Open National DNA Data Base, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 
12, 1998, at 10-A. 
30Id. 
31Id. 
32Primer, supra note 9, at 5. 
33Wade, supra note 29. 
34Id. 
35Id. 
36Alun Anderson, Murderers Have Rights Too, NEW SCIENTIST, print edition, May 23, 
1998, at 18.  Closer to home, in December, 1997, the police commissioner of New York city 
recommended that anyone arrested for a crime- not necessarily convicted- be required to 
submit a DNA sample.  Jeffrey Kluger, DNA Detectives, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 62. 
37Anderson, supra note 36, at 18. 
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III.  THE “FELON” CASES:  AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW 
In order to predict the limits of nonconsensual taking of DNA, it is necessary to 
examine the parameters of current non-consensual taking and the reasoning behind 
existing decisions.  Several federal courts as well as a number of states have upheld 
statutes authorizing the nonconsensual taking of blood from certain offenders for the 
purpose of establishing a DNA database to aid law enforcement officials in solving 
crimes.38  While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of the 
constitutionality of taking DNA for the specific purpose of establishing a database, 
several Supreme Court cases speak to the issue of taking physical specimens 
generally and serve as a foundation for the circuit courts’ decisions.  Defendants 
most frequently assert Fourth Amendment rights.39  The Supreme Court first held in 
Schmerber v. California40 that at least with respect to free persons, the bodily 
intrusion which results from taking a blood sample is a search within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment.41  The Court later affirmed this holding in Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Ex’rs’ Ass’n42, which justified taking blood from railway employees for drug 
and alcohol testing.43  These cases classified the test as a “minor intrusion”44 which is 
relevant in establishing that a search and seizure is “reasonable” under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
To satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement of “reasonableness,” searches 
generally must be based on individualized suspicion.45  Brown v. Texas46 established 
an exception to the requirement for a warrant in the context of roadside checkpoints, 
where the minimal intrusion involved in the search and seizure of automobiles was 
balanced against the government’s interest in the search and seizure and the degree 
to which the search advanced that interest.47  In a subsequent decision, the Court 
created an additional exception providing that an intrusion which is “slight” or 
“minimal” may be justified as reasonable even without individualized suspicion.48  
Two years later in 1992, the first challenge to a state statute authorizing mandatory 
blood samples for a DNA databank was decided against this backdrop in Jones v. 
Murray.49 
                                                                
38See supra note 8. 
39U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
40384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
41Id. at 767. 
42Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
43Id. at 634. 
44Id. at 625, Schmerber 384 U.S. 757 at 772. 
45Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). 
46443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
47Id. at 50-51. 
48Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), aff’d, 506 N.W.2d 209 
(Mich. 1993) (in the context of sobriety checkpoints and applying the Brown balancing test).  
49962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/8
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The Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia statute which authorized the involuntary 
extraction of blood from inmates in custody prior to release for the purpose of 
establishing a DNA databank to aid in future law enforcement. In addition, 
Virginia’s Department of Corrections regulations provided for punishment by loss of 
good conduct credits if an inmate refused.50  The inmates claimed that the statute and 
punishment provision violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure.  The court responded by distinguishing the prison blood test from 
a criminal investigation, and indicated that it also served the separate purpose of 
ascertaining and recording the identification of a person who is lawfully confined to 
prison.51  The court went further to say that no case establishes a requirement of 
probable cause or even a lesser requirement of individual suspicion for such purpose, 
because this has already supplied the basis for bringing the person into the criminal 
justice system.52  In response to the objection that the blood sample may not be 
necessary as proof of the specific crime for which the inmate has been incarcerated, 
the court stated that the identity of a suspect arrested on probable cause becomes a 
matter of legitimate state interest.  At this point the suspect cannot claim privacy in 
his identity, just as he cannot when fingerprints are used as a routine part of the 
booking procedure, even if they are not necessary as proof of the particular crime.53  
Judges have made both analogies and contrasts between DNA and fingerprints as 
identifying characteristics in the sense of the extent of the invasion of privacy 
involved. 
The majority in Jones likens the governmental justification for taking DNA as a 
form of identification to the justifications advanced for taking fingerprints and 
photos.54  In another case, the court goes further to say that “the information derived 
from the blood sample is substantially the same as that derived from 
fingerprinting.”55  These statements, while true with strict respect to the identification 
record, ignore the immense difference in the potential information that the two 
samples can provide.  If a person’s fingerprints become public knowledge, others 
will only be limited in the use of that information to discovering where the person 
has put their hands.  By contrast, misuse of genetic information could ultimately 
result in publication of the person’s predisposition to mental and physical conditions, 
which could be stigmatizing at least and potentially damaging to employment 
opportunity or accessibility to insurance coverage. 
In another decision, the majority also makes a colorful analogy and a convincing 
argument that DNA samples are no more a “hidden attribute” than fingerprints, 
pointing out that just as the public ordinarily does not scrutinize others’ hands with a 
magnifying glass, nor is a person’s DNA public knowledge any more than if the 
person had a bloody nose.56  This comparison is a good illustration of why the taking 
                                                                
50Id. 
51Id. at 306. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
54Jones, 962 F.2d at 307. 
55Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559 (9th Cir. 1995). 
56State ex rel. In re Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 435 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
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of a blood sample is within constitutional limits as a means of identifying criminals, 
a concept with which there is little disagreement.57  The potential for misuse with its 
resultant implications and the need for protective legislation have not completely 
escaped all judges.  For example, the lengthy dissent in Rise v. Oregon cautions that 
DNA information is more than an “identifying marker,” and notes that uniquely 
private genetic facts should be subject to rigorous confidentiality requirements even 
broader than those which protect medical records.58  Some of the state legislatures 
have also recognized the need for protecting how DNA sample information is used, 
and have incorporated limitations on use within the statutes.59  Application and 
enforcement of such provisions remains to be seen. 
The court in Jones also weighed the government’s interest in preserving a 
permanent identification record of convicted felons for resolving past and future 
crimes against the “minor intrusion” on the person.60  The government interest was 
supported by statistics from a Department of Justice study of recidivism,61 but the 
court stipulated that the effectiveness of the plan need not be high where the 
objective is significant and the privacy intrusion is limited.62  The court relied on 
Dunn v. White, which allowed the mandatory blood testing of prisoners for H.I.V., to 
demonstrate that the inmate has a diminished expectation of privacy in his body.63  
The court in Jones ultimately found that the Fourth Amendment does not require an 
additional finding of individual suspicion before blood can be taken from 
incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them, thus defeating the prisoners’ 
challenge.64  The Ninth and Tenth Circuits followed suit on the same reasoning.65   
                                                                
57See Jeffrey Kluger, DNA Detectives, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 62 (reporting results of an 
opinion poll which indicated that seventy-one percent of people polled think it is a good idea 
for the FBI to create a DNA database with information gathered from suspected criminals and 
crime scenes throughout the country). 
58Rise, 59 F.3d at 1556 n.3 (Nelson, D.W., dissenting). 
59See Jones, 962 F.2d at 304 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.6, which establishes as a 
crime the unauthorized dissemination or use of information from the databank); and Rise, 59 
F.3d at 1561 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §181.085(2) which prohibits analysis for genetic 
predisposition to mental or physical conditions, and also limits who has access to the 
information). 
60Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. 
61See id.  Since the DNA database would be compiled from samples from persons already 
convicted, its usefulness would be primarily in identifying repeat offenders.  The Department 
of Justice Study was used to show that a significant amount of crime is committed by prior 
offenders. 
62Id. at 308. 
63880 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990). 
64962 F.2d at 306-07. 
65Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998); Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940 
(10th Cir. 1996); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 
1556 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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The challenges to the mandatory DNA sample statutes do not end with the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Ex Post Facto clause66 has also been implicated.  An ex post facto 
law has been defined as one that “punishes as a crime an act previously committed, 
which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for 
a crime, after its commission...”67  The Jones court held that Virginia’s enactment 
punishing an inmate’s refusal to submit DNA samples is not such a law, indicating 
that the United States Supreme Court expressly overruled the broader definition 
suggested in Kring v. Missouri.68  The Virginia statute authorizing the databank was 
found to be a “reasonable regulation,” not penal in nature, and was therefore subject 
to reasonable amendments as necessary for good prison administration.69  This paved 
the way for other corrections institutions to enforce state statutes that provide for 
enforcement of the mandatory DNA samples from criminal offenders by denying 
parole and removing good behavior credits.  The trend in striking down 
constitutional challenges continues to hold. 
In response to an inmate’s contention that the drawing of blood was contrary to 
his religious beliefs and would, according to those beliefs, condemn him to eternal 
damnation,70 the court denied relief under the Free Exercise clause of the First 
Amendment.71  If a statute is neutral and generally applicable, and is not applied 
differently to the inmate because of his religious beliefs, there is no violation, and 
such laws may be enforced even absent a compelling governmental interest.72  Given 
this interpretation of the statute in Shaffer, and assuming that the similar statutes of 
other states are also generally applicable and applied even-handedly, those statutes 
will have the support of the Supreme Court against a claim that the right to freely 
exercise religion is violated as well.   
In another innovative challenge, a Kansas statute survived a Fifth Amendment 
claim that such a law compelled self incrimination.73  The court found that the DNA 
samples are not testimonial in nature, and that due process does not pose a barrier to 
the statute’s conditioning of parole on submission of samples, because there is no 
constitutional right to be released before the expiration of a valid sentence.74  As a 
result, the statute may stand in absence of the implication of a liberty interest 
protected by due process. 
                                                                
66U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
67Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925). 
68107 U.S. 221, 228-9 (1883) (the definition included any law which “alters the situation 
of a party to his disadvantage”), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990). 
69Jones, 962 F.2d at 309.  See also Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 486 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the statute does not add punishment for the original crime). 
70Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998). 
71U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
72Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-5 (1990). 
73Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996). 
74Id. at 1340-41; accord Ewell, 11 F.3d at 488 (statute does not violate due process 
because the Department of Corrections’ operating procedure provides “due process and more” 
by specifying procedures for recourse for inmates). 
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The preceding discussion has effectively demonstrated that nonconsensual taking 
of samples for DNA databases as a tool for the accurate identification and 
prosecution of adult felons can withstand the demands of the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments, the Ex Post Facto clause, and due process.  These verdicts, taken as a 
whole, provide a general rule:  DNA may be taken from adult convicted felons 
without consent and without any additional requirements of individualized suspicion 
or probable cause, and may be cataloged in a database and used for identification 
purposes in future criminal investigations.  It is easy to see the appeal of a system 
that can identify criminals more quickly and efficiently.  It is also worth noting that 
this method of identification serves the public interest by accurately prosecuting 
crimes and potentially exculpating an accused innocent.75  The following sections 
will develop the rule regarding mandatory DNA sampling of more controversial 
groups and also regarding applications beyond criminal investigation. 
With statutes very similar to those which pertain to adult felons, states have 
mandated drawing blood from juveniles for use in a DNA database as well.76  The 
Oregon statute authorizes the procedure only if the juvenile commits an act which, if 
done by an adult, would constitute one of the enumerated felonies, including mostly 
sex offenses and murder.77  In Maricopa as well, the court held that the state may 
take DNA from a juvenile pursuant to the Arizona statute based on a delinquent act 
and may use it for identification purposes beyond the age of majority.78  The court’s 
holding is significant because on its face, it could be interpreted to contradict another 
Arizona statute which prohibits using the disposition of a child in juvenile court in 
any other court.79  While the court recognized the role of the juvenile system in the 
protection, treatment and guidance of children, it still held that the use of DNA test 
results beyond the age of majority does not violate the Arizona statute because the 
statute relates to adjudication and punishment, whereas the DNA test is not 
punitive.80  This holding could be viewed as indicative of the movement of 
mandatory DNA testing into general society, in light of the traditional protectionist 
role of the state over children.  This could, however, be a hasty conclusion if one 
recognizes that, as applied to juveniles, the practice serves the same law enforcement 
objectives and is premised on the fact that the individual committed a crime and is in 
the lawful custody of the state. 
These cases indicate that the previously stated rule for the nonconsensual taking 
of DNA may be expanded to encompass juvenile felony offenders as well as 
convicted adult felons.  Based on the holdings which emphasize that the same 
intrusion on privacy involved in nonconsensual DNA sampling of criminal offenders 
                                                                
75Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561. 
76See, e.g., In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action Nos. JV-512600 and JV-
512797, 930 P.2d 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) [hereinafter Maricopa], and State ex rel. Juvenile 
Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
77Orozco, 878 P.2d at 434. 
78930 P.2d at 500-01. 
79ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-207(C) (1998). 
80Maricopa, 930 P.2d at 501. 
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would not be acceptable as applied to free persons,81 it seems unlikely that DNA as a 
system of national identification would be extended to all citizens.  This proposition 
is not as sound as one might assume, considering both international precedent and, 
even closer to “innocents” at home, precedent from the United States Armed Forces. 
IV.  NON-CRIMINALS AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE 
A.  Mayfield v. Dalton82 
Due mainly to concerns about the lack of safeguards against the use of DNA 
samples for purposes other than identification, two Marines challenged the 
constitutionality of a Department of Defense program to collect and store blood and 
tissue samples from all members of the armed forces on active duty for future DNA 
analysis.83  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held the challenge to the DNA collection 
program moot, because the two Marines were “honorably separated from active 
duty” after the district court decision.84  This meant that they were no longer required 
to give blood or tissue samples for the Department of Defense repository.  
Furthermore, the court refused to consider the challenges to “regulations that might 
apply to them in the future” because those issues were not “ripe” controversies.85  
The court indicated changes that the military made to the DNA repository scheme in 
support of its holding that the issue of misuse was not ripe for adjudication. 
The court stated that the changes made “appear to respond to some of the 
plaintiffs-appellants’ main concerns,” and included the full text of the April 1996 
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 
(“Memorandum”) within the opinion.86  Essentially, then, the court endorsed the 
military’s voluntary schematic changes while simultaneously avoiding a legal 
analysis and decision on the merits by dismissing the case.87  The military 
Memorandum specifically addresses the concerns that the samples could be used to 
deny employment or insurance on the basis of the genetic information that the 
samples can provide.88  As a result, the length of time for which the samples are 
retained was decreased from seventy-five to fifty years, and individual specimen 
samples will be destroyed upon the request of the donor after completion of the 
service obligation.89  Permissible uses of the specimens are itemized in the 
Memorandum.  In addition to more benign uses such as identification of human 
remains, internal quality assurance to validate the process, and purposes consented to 
by the donor or next-of-kin, the Memorandum also provides for a more controversial 
                                                                
81Jones, 962 F.2d at 306 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)). 
82Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423 (1997). 
83Id. 
84Id. at 1425. 
85Id. 
86Id. at 1425-26. 
87Id. at 1426. 
88Mayfield, 109 F.3d at 1426. 
89Id. 
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use of the samples—investigation or prosecution of any crime which is punishable 
by one year or more of confinement.90  This compels a discussion of the proper legal 
standard for the nonconsensual search and seizure of the DNA of non-criminals, and, 
if it is ever permissible, how the information may be used.   
The district court held that taking blood and tissue samples for the military 
repository constitutes a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment,91 but did 
not apply the “special needs” test. 92  Under the “special needs” exception to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements in a noncriminal search, a warrant may not 
be required “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make 
the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable.”93  Skinner is the only 
case where a special need sufficient to support searches of government employees 
was recognized by the Supreme Court.94  The special need which justified the 
involuntary blood and urine drug analysis was public protection and safety, because 
the employees were railway operators.95  The Court emphasized that the exception 
was justified due to the safety concern, and that the government’s objective was not 
prosecution.96  The initial rule from Skinner instructs that DNA may be taken from 
non-criminals without a warrant and without consent, provided the government’s 
objective is the protection of the public’s health and safety and does not relate to 
criminal prosecution. 
This emphasis was ignored by the district court in Mayfield, which distinguished 
the case from Skinner by noting that disciplinary and criminal consequences were 
possible.97  Notice that while Skinner emphasized a non-prosecutorial objective to 
justify the nonconsensual search of government employees, Mayfield relied on the 
possibility of penalty to distinguish the military repository as a lesser invasion of 
privacy that was, therefore, outweighed by the government’s greater interest in the 
identification of remains.98  This is somewhat confusing, because the district court 
distinguished the case from Skinner, suggesting that the “special needs” balancing 
test was not applicable, yet went on to balance the lesser invasion of privacy in favor 
of the government’s interest.  Despite the contradiction, Skinner supplies the proper 
standard for searches and seizures whenever the government breaches constitutional 
                                                                
90Id. 
91U.S. CONST. amend. 4. 
92Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 303 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated, 109 F.3d 1423 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
93New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). 
94Skinner v. Railway Labor Ex’rs’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
95Id. at 620-21.  Other special needs have justified exceptions to the warrant and probable 
cause requirements, but none are implicated in Mayfield.  See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868 (1987) (government’s need to run an effective probation program); O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709 (1987) (the need for effective operation of a government office); Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520 (1979) (the need to operate a federal prison safely). 
96Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5. 
97Mayfield, 901 F. Supp. at 303. 
98Id. 
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requirements and does not rely on established exceptions to the requirement of a 
warrant:  the government may take DNA without probable cause or individualized 
suspicion only if the primary objective relates to the protection of public health and 
safety, and is outside normal law enforcement needs. 
In the case of the military repository, the government’s special need does not 
actually exceed the normal needs of law enforcement as required under the “special 
needs” test because the information can potentially be used in the course of criminal 
prosecution.99  In other words, if the court in Mayfield had applied the test correctly, 
it would have found that taking DNA samples for the purposes outlined by the 
Department of Defense constitutes an unconstitutional search and seizure.  If this 
position is accepted, it leads to the conclusion that the repository is not amenable to 
the “special needs” exception, because the potential for use of the DNA is not 
beyond the needs of normal law enforcement.100   
The preceding analysis reiterates the real, underlying fear where the taking and 
storing of DNA samples is involved.  It is apparently an accepted practice as it 
pertains to the identification of convicted felons, and it appears acceptable as  used in 
identifying the remains of military personnel; even the two marines in Mayfield did 
not contest that.  Apprehension enters once it appears possible that the genetic 
information is not sufficiently safeguarded against misuse, or that Fourth 
Amendment requirements may be circumvented by justifying a warrantless, 
nonconsensual search and seizure as not motivated by law enforcement needs, but 
then using the fruits of that warrantless search later in a criminal prosecution.  
International trend does little to allay these fears. 
B.  A National DNA Database in Iceland 
On December 16, 1998, Iceland passed a bill which will allow a single, private 
biotechnology company called deCODE to build a database of the genetic code of 
the entire population.101  The corporation will also hold a twelve year monopoly on 
data marketing rights.102  The plan to collect blood and obtain DNA samples is 
expected to begin in six months,103 through agreements with hospitals, clinics, and 
individual physicians to submit patients’ medical records.104  The purpose of the 
project is to speed up the search for specific disease-linked genes for the 
development of improved diagnostic tools, and to improve the country’s health care 
system.105  Iceland is an ideal nation for the study because of its incredibly 
                                                                
99Robert Craig Scherer, Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the Fourth Amendment:  The 
Need for a New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEO. L.J. 2007, 2014 (1997) (suggesting that Mayfield 
did not properly apply the “special needs” test, and proposing an amended test). 
100Id. 
101Martin Enserink, Iceland Oks Private Health Databank, SCIENCE, Jan. 1, 1999 at 13. 
102John Schwartz, Iceland to Sell the Genetic Code of Whole Country, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Jan. 12, 1999 at 7-A. 
103Id. 
104Enserink, supra note 101. 
105Id. 
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homogeneous population of approximately 270,000 residents, which translates into a 
comparatively simple gene pool.106 
Critics, though in the minority, include the nation’s leading scientists and 
scholars who have been vocal and relentless.  On one hand is concern over 
deCODE’s influence over the Icelandic legislature in the drafting of the bill.107  On 
the other is the privacy issue.  Patients will not be asked for their consent before the 
addition of the information into the database.108  Opponents admonish that there is a 
potential for stigmatization and job discrimination when details about mental illness 
or other health problems are made public.109  Due to the project’s reliance on the 
medical field, there is also the potential for patients to withhold such personal 
information about their medical history from their doctors.110  Critics argue for 
official safeguards for privacy, and have considered possibilities for recourse, 
including a movement to overturn the law.111  Aside from that, a significant number 
of doctors have pledged not to send information to the database without the specific 
request of their patients, in an effort to “drag their feet” and thwart the effort to 
utilize physicians to accumulate the genetic data of their patients.112  While one 
physician working for deCODE insists that people are being unduly paranoid, David 
Banisar of the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington urges that 
“turning the population into electronic guinea pigs” should serve as a warning to 
Americans.113 
According to a Time magazine opinion poll, most Americans are indeed 
uncomfortable with the same practices that concern critics in Iceland.114  Seventy-one 
percent of those polled said they disapproved of private companies getting patents on 
genes.115  Even though the United States could hardly be said to have a small, 
homogeneous population like that of Iceland, private companies are working, in fact 
racing, against the federal Human Genome Project in an effort to have patent rights 
to genetic information.116  Although the legal standard regarding government 
                                                                
106Schwartz, supra note 102. 
107Enserink, supra note 101. 
108Id. 
109Schwartz, supra note 102. 
110Id. 
111Enserink, supra note 101. 
112Id. 
113Schwartz, supra note 102. 
114Dick Thompson, Gene Maverick, TIME, January 11, 1999 at 54. 
115Id. 
116Michael D. Lemonick and Dick Thompson, supra note 4, at 46-7.  The article discusses 
the Human Genome Project and the profit motive, and reports that pharmaceutical companies 
stand to make billions of dollars by turning research into new treatments for diseases.  Those 
that find and patent the information first stand to make the most; hence the “race.”  Private 
projects (conducted, for example, by Celera Genomics Corp., Incyte Pharmaceuticals in 
California and Genset in France) are finding ways to beat out the federally-funded project.  
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searches and seizures of non-criminals’ DNA samples has been clarified and may 
assuage fears of a government-mandated database, there are grounds to believe that 
private genetic discrimination is more than unfounded paranoia. 
V.  GENETIC PREDISPOSITION AND DISCRIMINATION 
A.  Employers and Genetic Discrimination 
Genetic discrimination has been defined as the “denial of rights, privileges or 
opportunities on the basis of information obtained from genetically-based diagnostic 
and prognostic tests.”117  Employers take an interest in the use of genetic information 
to predict physical and mental health conditions for several reasons, including the 
potential for increased medical insurance premiums, absenteeism, lowered 
productivity, and greater risk in the line of duty, which translates into more workers’ 
compensation claims.118  While these may be legitimate reasons with respect to 
safety and economic concerns of a business, there is a potential for unnecessary 
discrimination if results of genetic testing are not carefully interpreted.  The 
individuals most at risk for this type of discrimination include the following:  1) 
asymptomatic individuals who carry a gene that increases the probability of 
developing some disease, 2) individuals called “carriers” who are heterozygotes for 
some recessive genetic condition, but who are and will remain asymptomatic, 3) 
individuals with one or more genetic polymorphisms that are not known to cause any 
medical condition, and 4) immediate relatives of individuals with known or 
presumed genetic conditions.119 
Just how great is the risk that employers will actually rely extensively on genetic 
information in the course of hiring and making business decisions?  Trend data on 
genetic screening and monitoring was produced in a 1989 survey by the United 
States Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).120  At that time, few 
companies were actually using genetic testing- only twenty health officers from the 
330 Fortune 500 companies (6%), but twice the number of companies were using 
genomic information in 1989 than were in 1982.121  Granted, these surveys are now 
ten years old, but there was also a survey designed to predict growth.  While the 
                                                          
After Celera announced its projected completion date, the federal project announced its own 
ahead-of-schedule plan. 
117Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination:  The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and 
Prognostic Tests By Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 110 (1991).  Another 
definition is “discrimination against an individual or against members of that individual’s 
family solely because of real or perceived differences from the “normal” genome in the 
genetic constitution of that individual.”  George P. Smith and Thaddeus J. Burns, Genetic 
Determinism or Genetic Discrimination?, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 26 (1994) 
(citing Marvin R. Natowicz, et al., Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS 465, 466 (1992).  This definition, based on discrimination in reliance on genetic 
information used to assess future risk of disability, attempts to distinguish discrimination 
based upon present disability). 
118Smith and Burns, supra note 117, at 27. 
119Id. at 26. 
120Gostin, supra note 115, at 117. 
121Id. 
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OTA reported fewer companies anticipated using genetic testing in 1989 than in 
1982, a 1989 survey of 400 firms by a life insurance company reported that fifteen 
percent planned to check the genetic status of prospective employees and their 
dependents by the year 2000 before making employment offers.122  Employers who 
responded based their answers on scientific consensus, cost, and the value of the data 
for predicting disease.123  It follows, then, that the progress of the Human Genome 
Project could serve only to increase the number of employers who will find genetic 
testing a viable basis for employment decisions as the predictive nature of the data is 
increased and the costs of the tests are driven down through technological advances. 
Even at the early date of those surveys, a real impact on employees or potential 
employees was becoming evident, usually to the detriment of the employee in the 
form of transferal or dismissal from their position.124  It is a common misconception 
that the presence of a genetic trait can be equated with actual disability, even without 
correlating any existing impairment with the actual ability to meet qualification 
standards.  In reality, however, a person could be an unaffected carrier, 
asymptomatic, “at risk” only, or could have just a minor form of the impairment.125  
This type of misconception is relevant to the application of disability discrimination 
law, discussed in the next section. 
Before turning the attention to current legislative protections, and whether 
genetic predisposition fits into any of the current frameworks, it makes sense to first 
determine whether it is feasible that employers will have access to genetic 
information by examining legal precedent.  Historically, occupational physicians and 
their relationship with patients in that context was not categorized as a physician-
patient relationship.126  Accordingly, the physicians were considered clients of the 
employer, not the worker/patient, and therefore were not liable for medical 
malpractice by failing to disclose information to patients about their own 
condition.127  This view has become more relaxed, however, and courts have 
distinguished between mere testing and care and treatment in passing judgment on 
disclosure requirements.128  As a result, when an employee is treated by an 
                                                                
122Id. at 116. 
123Id. 
124Id. at 117-18 (The 1982 OTA survey reported that seven of the eighteen companies that 
were taking action on the basis of genetic testing transferred or dismissed the “at risk” 
employee, although the 1989 data reported that only two of the Fortune 500 companies 
surveyed admitted to rejecting an applicant or transferring an employee due at least in part to 
genetic test results). 
125Gostin, supra note 117, at 118.  See also Smith and Burns, supra note 117, at 26 
(describing individuals most at risk for genetic discrimination). 
126Lori B. Andrews and Ami S. Gaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in the 
Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 88 (1991). 
127Id. at 89. 
128Id., citing Greenstein v. Forrell, 143 Misc. 880, 257 N.Y.S. 673 (1932) (Where a 
physician actually treats a patient, a physician-patient relationship exists), and Keene v. 
Wiggins, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (no physician-patient relationship where 
physician merely examined worker). 
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occupational physician, the employee as a patient has a right to the pertinent medical 
information, but what information does the employer have a right to know? 
Courts do recognize that employees’ medical information can be important to an 
employer, and have held that physicians employed by the company primarily answer 
to the company and may disclose information about patients in which the company 
has an interest.129  In addition, some doctors who are not employed by a company 
may be able to disclose patient information to their employer.130  In one example, a 
Virginia statute provides that any workers’ compensation health care provider 
attending any injured employee shall furnish the employer with a copy of the 
medical report at the employer’s request.131  This statute does not seem amenable to 
expansion to include genetic information, since it specifically addresses 
examinations into work-related injury.  However, Connecticut specifically allows the 
disclosure of information collected about an employee to the employer by entities 
other than physicians, such as NIOSH, regarding occupational illness and 
susceptibility to illness.132  In contrast to the enactments which treat the divulgence 
of medical information to employers permissively, the American Occupational 
Medical Association advises in its Code of Ethical Conduct that employers are 
entitled to counsel about medical fitness in relation to work, but not to diagnoses or 
details of a specific nature, even if the physician is paid by the company.133  By the 
language, then, this principle would not be effective against genetic information 
which the employer could demonstrate had a relation to work.  Remember, too, that 
even if the information could potentially affect some work aspect or performance, we 
are dealing with genetic predisposition only, which is not an absolute indicator of 
actual impairment.  Keep this in mind as current federal disability legislation is 
examined as one possible safeguard against genetic discrimination. 
B.  Genetic Predisposition in the Framework of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)134 
The ADA of 1990 extends the protection from discrimination based upon 
disability afforded under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to private employers, public 
services, public accommodations, and telecommunications.135  State disability 
                                                                
129Andrews and Gaeger, supra note 126, at 94-95, citing Leonard v. Wilson, 8 So.2d 12, 
14 (Fla. 1942).  The authors warn that this holding could lend to the interpretation that genetic 
testing in the workplace implies consent to release of all results to the employer. 
130Id. at 95. 
131Id., at 96 citing VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-88.1 (1987). 
132Id., citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-383 (1987). 
133Id. at 95.  An absolute prohibition of genetic discrimination may not be the desired end.  
In some circumstances, discrimination may protect the safety of workers or the public.  
Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 653, 663 (1998).  
Care must be taken, then, not to allow employers to claim this as a guise, when routine 
physical exams could detect early symptoms of disease, or an occupational exposure could be 
eliminated, rather than excluding those more susceptible to the resulting harm.   
134Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended by the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 at 42 U.S.C. § 12101). 
13529 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988). 
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statutes closely follow the federal civil rights format,136 so the ADA will be the focus 
of this analysis of disability discrimination statutes as a form of redress for genetic 
discrimination.  According to information received by the Congressional Bioethics 
Advisory Committee, the legislative history behind the ADA indicates that genetic 
discrimination was “not raised or discussed,” and so could not be addressed by the 
Conference Committees, leaving the issue of whether genetic discrimination fits 
within the scope of the ADA to the courts for determination.137 
The first step in determining whether genetic discrimination is properly adapted 
to the statutory framework of the ADA is looking at how the statute defines 
“disability.”  The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities... (B) a record of such 
impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”138  The ADA also 
defines what constitutes an impairment as “any physiological disorder or condition, 
disfigurement or anatomical loss affecting any of the major bodily systems, or any 
mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, mental illness or 
dementia.”139  The definition indicates that a person need not actually have a physical 
or mental impairment; rather, it is sufficient if the individual has a record of 
impairment or is perceived to have an impairment.  The distinction was meant to 
include discrimination based on false belief as to an individual’s limitation in the 
scope of the ADA, in order to guard against discrimination based on prejudice and 
irrational fear.140  It is in these situations that society’s reaction, rather than an actual 
disability, limits a person’s ability to enjoy equal access to rights and services.141 
By definition, a person is considered disabled for purposes of coverage under the 
ADA only if the physical or mental impairment “substantially limits” one or more 
“major life activities.”142  Courts have interpreted the statute to include working 
(employment) as a major life activity.143  It follows, then, that by treating someone as 
if he or she were unable to work, for example by not hiring that person on the basis 
                                                                
136Gostin, supra note 117, at 120. 
137This information was relayed to the Congressional Bioethics Advisory Committee by 
Congressman Steny Hoyer, the Floor Manager in the House, who, while indicating the lack of 
attention to the issue, also indicated that genetic discrimination was “improper” and “very 
dangerous.” 
13842 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1990). 
139Id. 
140Gostin, supra note 117, at 122 (citing S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 23 
(1989).  It is suggested that genetic traits for diseases should be covered under the ADA, 
whereas genetic determinants for eye and hair color, for example, which are designated as 
general personal characteristics, should not be covered.  Id. 
141Gostin, supra note 117, at 123.  In the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines, it is also 
unlawful to discriminate on the basis of genetic information relating to illness or disease.  
Bryce A. Lenox, Genetic Discrimination in Insurance and Employment: Spoiled Fruits of the 
Human Genome Project, 23 U. DAYTON L.REV. 189, 205 (1997).  However, these are not 
statutory enactment’s, and the courts are not required to defer to them. 
14242 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). 
143Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).  
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of genetic predisposition when there is no actual disability, an employer could 
essentially be said to be regarding that person as having the disease itself.144  Under 
this interpretation, the ADA could be a viable remedy for discrimination based on 
genetic predisposition.  On the other hand, this is not the only possible interpretation.  
It can also be argued that by not hiring someone solely on the basis of genetic 
predisposition, the employer is not regarding that person as having a present 
impairment.  Although discrimination against a person who has a record of an 
impairment is prohibited,145 discrimination based on future potential to develop an 
impairment is not strictly within the text of the ADA.  Therefore, genetic 
predisposition is not necessarily a prohibited characteristic, and the ADA is not an 
automatic safeguard against discrimination on that basis. 
The next logical inquiry would be whether a person who is presently healthy but 
carries a gene for a certain disease can be classified as “disabled” within the meaning 
of the ADA.  Obesity has been held to be a handicap even without current disability 
to the individual, with the admonition that an “employer cannot deny employment 
simply because the condition has been detected before it has actually begun to 
produce deleterious effects.”146  In a more recent, and even more analogous United 
States Supreme Court case, it was held that even in the asymptomatic stage, HIV 
infection is an impairment which substantially limits the major life activity of 
reproduction, strongly suggesting that HIV infection is a disability per se.147  The 
Court reasoned that people infected with HIV are already experiencing major 
physiological effects, even before they manifest symptoms, and that knowledge of 
the impending consequences to themselves and to their sexual partners and future 
children has a substantial effect on those types of decisions.148  The Court’s 
reasoning could support the proposition that genetic predisposition is in itself a 
disability, but only if the disease to which an individual is predisposed is one which 
affects an established major life activity even in the asymptomatic period.  This 
would seem feasible in regard to many major diseases, especially those that are 
hereditary or terminal, because just as HIV infection affects the decision to have 
children, so does predisposition to a disease that has similar effects on family 
planning.  The downside is that this does not definitively provide recourse for all 
genetic discrimination under the ADA, especially where the potential disease can be 
distinguished from the category of impairments which affect a major life activity 
(such as reproduction) in the asymptomatic stage. 
                                                                
144This analysis relies on the ADA definitions which prohibit discrimination against a 
person who is regarded as having an impairment which limits a major life activity, and the 
assumption that work is a major life activity, such that by refusing to hire a person on the basis 
of genetic predisposition, an employer is actually attempting to exclude that person based on 
the possibility that a disability will eventually develop.  42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).  This would 
also be in accord with the legislative intent to distinguish genetic traits for diseases from those 
for personal characteristics.  Gostin, supra note 115, at 144, n.70. 
14542 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). 
146State Div. of Hum. Rts. v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1985).  
147Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998).  
148Id. at 2206. 
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Many states have recognized the need for legislation to control genetic 
discrimination, and perhaps the shortcomings of available federal legislation, as 
evidenced by more than thirty states which have passed laws which prohibit the 
genetic testing of applicants for purposes of employment or insurance.149  In addition, 
as of this writing, at least seventy more genetic discrimination bills are pending in 
twenty-four states and twelve are pending before Congress.150  The content and 
efficacy of some of the various state statutes currently in effect will be examined 
later in this paper.  As indicated earlier, the effects of the availability of genetic 
information on employment and insurance are the main focus of this note.  The basic 
structure of federal disability discrimination law as it applies to employment appears 
to be insufficient as a means of specifically targeting genetic discrimination.  Next, 
the insurance industry provides its own unique combination of law and public policy 
which creates different challenges for legislation aimed at the prohibition or control 
of genetic testing and discrimination. 
C.  Insurers and Genetic Discrimination 
The ADA does not restrict insurers or health care providers from carrying on 
with their normal activities consistent with basic principles of underwriting, 
classifying, and administering risks.151  Along the same lines, employers may set up 
and comply with the terms of employee benefit plans based on sound actuarial 
data.152  As a result, certain standard practices are acceptable, such as pre-existing 
condition clauses in health insurance contracts, limitations on coverage for certain 
procedures, or charging premiums proportionate to risk.153  In regard to genetic 
predisposition, the ramifications of these practices could be limited coverage if the 
actuarial data shows a likelihood of future illness, or denial of coverage if genetic 
predisposition is viewed as a pre-existing condition.154  One analogy is the initial 
response of insurance companies to  HIV infection, which was to conduct their own 
HIV tests and to regard HIV as an uninsurable condition.155  All of this information 
does not lend itself to a very bright outlook for the insurability of conditions which 
can be detected from our genes.  Because everyone will most likely be predisposed 
to something, if insurance companies begin to rely on the data revealed by the human 
genome efforts and conduct their own genetic tests, the impact on our health care 
system could be immense.  If people are limited or denied coverage for the major 
diseases that they are most likely to get, our country could foreseeably be forced into 
a system of nationalized health insurance.156 
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150Id. 
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156While the majority of Americans rejected the Clinton Administration’s proposals for a 
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The outlook may not be as ominous as it would first appear.  The ADA’s effect 
on insurers and employers is to prevent the use of underwriting as subterfuge for 
discrimination, meaning insurers cannot deny coverage completely on the basis of 
genetic predisposition, and employers cannot deny jobs because of the increased cost 
of insurance or a lack of insurance coverage of a particular disability.157  Instead, 
discrimination among disabled applicants must be based on sound actuarial data that 
indicates a heightened risk of contracting an illness in the future.158  Research to 
decipher the human genome, while nearing completion, is yet unfinished, and it 
presumably would take time to study and compile reliable data which predicts the 
likelihood of development of a disease in persons with the gene.  As a result, there is 
still time to devise laws to best control the problem. 
The proper approach to legislating the practices of the insurance industry requires 
consideration of the differing views of the social utility of health insurance and 
surrounding public policy.  There are two ways to view the insurance industry.  The 
first way is to look at the insurance industry from a strictly business perspective.159  
From that point of view, discrimination on the basis of actuarial data seems 
reasonable, because the “essence of underwriting” is classification according to risk, 
and it would not make sense to require an insurer to take what the data indicates to 
be a bad business risk.160  If this were the pervading view, the government might be 
inclined to adopt a “hands-off” approach with regard to insurance companies, which 
would create a greater propensity for an alternative system of health care as more 
and more people lacked private insurance coverage. 
The second view describes the insurance industry as an instrument of social 
policy.161  This view encompasses the concept of spreading risk across groups for 
wider access to health care services.  The practice of underwriting is threatening to 
this conception of purpose because, to those with genetic predisposition, health 
insurance may become unavailable or unaffordable to those most likely to become 
ill.162  Even though embracing this view means sharing the increased cost of other 
people’s illnesses, it may be preferable to the alternative.  In a Time magazine 
survey, eighty-eight percent of people polled said a person whose genetic profile 
shows potential problems should not pay higher health insurance rates than someone 
whose profile does not.163  Assuming this is the majority opinion, the appropriate 
legislative response would mandate control of underwriting practices in regard to 
genetic predisposition in light of the potential public willingness to share the risk 
                                                          
seek refuge in a nationalized health care plan absent a free-market alternative.  Hallowell, 
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across groups rather than pay proportionately to personal risk based on actuarial data.  
On the state level, the actual approaches taken with respect to legislation vary from 
state to state and from the context of the prospective application (for example, 
whether the law applies to insurance or to employment discrimination).  There has 
also been legislation on the federal level, although only applicable to health 
insurance.  Drafting appropriate legislation is difficult and requires attention to 
competing legal theories in order to effectively control the acquisition, use, and 
dissemination of genetic information in the intended context. 
VI.  CURRENT LEGISLATION 
A.  Introduction 
In 1997, the number of states that prohibit genetic discrimination by health 
insurers more than doubled to twenty-three states.164  Additionally, four states joined 
those that have legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination by employers, for a 
total of eleven.165  The only federal legislation enacted to date which prohibits 
genetic discrimination is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA).166  HIPAA, signed by President Clinton on August 21, 1996, states 
that genetic information shall not be considered a preexisting condition in the 
absence of a diagnosis of the actual condition.  The protection afforded by the 
HIPAA is limited, however, because it only covers group health plans, not individual 
policies, which cover ten to fifteen percent of those insured.167  Another drawback of 
the federal legislation is that it does not prevent an insurance institution from raising 
an entire group’s rates.168  As a result, HIPAA is not broad enough to ensure full 
protection from insurance discrimination, and does not even cover discrimination by 
employers or other undesirable uses of genetic information.   
                                                                
164Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 653, 656 
(1998).  See 1997 Ala. Acts 97-721; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (West 1998); CAL 
INS. CODE §§ 742.405, 10123.3, 10140 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 
(West 1998); 1997 Conn. Pub. Acts 97-95; 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-182; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-
54-1 to 8 (1997); 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 91; 1997 Ill. Pub. Act 90-25; IND. CODE ANN. §27-8-
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STAT. § 631.89 (1996). 
165Yesley, supra, note 164.  See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 229; 1997 Ill. Pub. Act 90-25; 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6 (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141:H-3 (1996); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1998); 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 350; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 
1993 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT §§ 659.036, 659.227 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 
(1997); 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1215; WIS. STAT. § 111.372 (1996). 
166Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
167Bryce A. Lenox, Comment, Genetic Discrimination in Insurance and Employment: 
Spoiled Fruits of the Human Genome Project, 23 U. DAYTON L.REV. 189, 208-9 (1997). 
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State legislation, while broader in the coverage of protected interests, is 
inconsistent.  Some states regulate health care or employment, some regulate only 
testing, while other states include protection of genetic information generally.169  
Given the state to state variability, this writing assumes the position that federal 
legislation is necessary as a comprehensive and uniform protection of various genetic 
interests.  In determining the best approach to such a task, there are several 
considerations. 
B.  Impediments to Effective Legislation 
There are two factors which impede effective legislation to successfully combat 
genetic discrimination.170  First is the difficulty of defining “genetic information” for 
the intended statutory purpose, given the mass of information with genetic 
significance.171  The states’ definitions vary.  Some states define genetic information 
narrowly, limiting it to a laboratory test of human chromosomes or DNA.172  The 
effect of laws that include these narrow definitions (limiting genetic information to 
direct tests for the purpose of discovering gene alterations) is a protection against the 
use of these types of tests by employers and insurers, but they do not prevent the use 
of indirect means of determining and discriminating on the basis of genetic 
predisposition.173  Other states have chosen a broader definition which encompasses 
“all information about genes, gene products, inherited characteristics, or family 
history/pedigree that is expressed in common language.”174  This definition is nearly 
all-inclusive because almost all clinical tests could be considered a test for gene 
products.  While the context and purpose of the test may be determinative of whether 
the test is included in a broad definition, the NIH has noted that the contents of most 
medical records will soon have potential genetic significance.175  In addition, laws 
with broader definitions may have a larger scope of protection, but may be 
impractical to implement.176   
The second impediment to effective legislation is the limited usefulness of laws 
narrowly focused on prohibiting genetic discrimination, and the possibility of 
unintended “perverse results.”177  For example, New York’s employment anti-
discrimination law does not protect individual privacy as to genetic information.178  
An employer may still require a genetic test, and may deny employment for refusal 
                                                                
169Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Comment, Genetic Information and Third Party Access to 
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178Id. at 659. 
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to be tested, but the employer cannot discriminate on the basis of the information 
obtained from the test.179  One might wonder, then, why New York allows employers 
to demand genetic tests at all.  The purpose is to allow employers to determine any 
increased risk of disease as a result of the work environment, however, the individual 
has the choice whether or not to be subjected to the risk.180  The result of this type of 
narrowly focused legislation is perverse if the desired end is protection of privacy 
because the law only precludes discrimination, not revelation of genetic information 
as a condition of hiring.  Perhaps the limited utility of narrowly focused laws are not 
really an impediment to effective legislation, but rather only to comprehensive 
legislation which attempts to prohibit or control all undesirable uses of genetic 
information by all possible sources.  The most effective laws, then, should not 
attempt a broad, impractical scheme, but instead tailor legislation specifically to 
address each problem individually. 
C.  Privacy Theory Versus Property Theory  
The preceding discussion demonstrates that there is a distinction between 
prohibiting genetic discrimination and protecting genetic privacy, and there are 
different approaches to protecting each interest.  Most state legislation fails to 
address both present and potential legal ramifications, and the state laws are 
confused as to the necessary level and type of protection to provide.181  The main 
issue is whether to classify genetic information as a property right or a privacy 
interest.182  Nearly all of the state genetic discrimination laws involve the protection 
of genetic privacy, but four states declare that genetic information is the individual’s 
property.183   
Whereas the right in property establishes an individual’s ownership of material in 
relation to other people with respect to that property, creating a “bundle of rights,”184 
a privacy interest attaches substantive due process rights to the information, 
triggering a heightened judicial scrutiny and requiring the state to show a compelling 
interest in order to infringe upon the protected sphere.185  Privacy and property rights 
have followed different paths of evolution in American law.  Property rights have 
developed from the common law of the individual states, and are accordingly not 
uniform and may be open to interpretation in the context of the proper application to 
genetic information.186  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
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right to privacy as fundamental and essential to individual liberty, inferring the 
possibility that privacy rights may hold a more constitutionally stable position.187  
The background and current interpretations of each of these rights merits attention in 
order to determine which is a more feasible basis for the protection of genetic 
information.  The analysis will show that the best choice is dependent on the persons 
and activities that the legislation is intended to protect or regulate.188 
D.  The Privacy Interest 
In 1977, before the need to protect genetic information was even within the 
Court’s cognizance, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute which required 
the establishment of a state database with the names and addresses of all persons 
who had obtained, by prescription, drugs with both lawful and unlawful markets.189  
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court specifically held that individuals have a 
constitutionally protected “zone of privacy,” and the privacy interest against the 
disclosure of personal matters falls within this zone.190  The law was upheld because 
the statute did not pose a “grievous” threat due to the extensive security measures 
afforded to protect the patients’ identities.191  The decision emphasized that the 
confidentiality provisions of the statute kept it within constitutional bounds, a 
determination the court made after an extensive investigation of the reporting system 
involved and a comparison with other states.192   
Whalen provides a sound basis for predicting the fate of potential state databases 
established for the purpose of obtaining genetic information.  Whereas the current 
databases contain the identifying DNA of convicted felons, and are held to a less 
stringent standard of justification given the diminished privacy rights in comparison 
with the state interest in preventing and solving crimes,193 citizens at large could 
claim the constitutionally protected privacy interest against disclosure of personal 
matters with regard to genetic information if a state attempted to establish an all-
inclusive database.  If the court adhered to Whalen, researchers could establish such 
databases for purely scientific purposes, so long as donors’ anonymity was protected, 
and statutes permitting the discovery of genetic information without the donor’s 
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permission would certainly be considered a “grievous” threat if identity was 
unprotected and the information could be used to adversely discriminate against the 
donor. 
Unfortunately, the creation of a privacy interest in genetic information is not 
without drawbacks when it comes to implementation.  It has been pointed out that 
laws with privacy measures will not necessarily guard against discrimination.194  For 
example, the requirement of informed consent does not prevent an employer or 
insurer from conditioning acceptance on submission to a genetic test; the applicant 
may refuse, but he or she will not be eligible for coverage or employment.195  In 
order to achieve protection against discrimination, legislation must either prohibit 
such tests directly or control the use of the results.   
E.  Property Rights 
Proponents of property theory as the proper mechanism for protecting the 
individual’s interest in genetic information have asserted that property rights are 
“fundamental,” in an effort to invoke constitutional protection.196  One proponent 
argues that since the framers of the Constitution felt very strongly about property 
rights, which included the right to one’s physical characteristics, and since these are 
determined by genetic composition, they should be constitutionally protected.197  The 
Supreme Court held in Truax v. Corrigan198 that a state is obligated to recognize and 
protect certain fundamental property interests from restriction.199  However, although 
Truax has since been cited favorably, it has been viewed as the “high-water mark” 
for substantive due process protection of property rights, and the Supreme Court has 
not since addressed whether property rights are fundamental.200   
Human tissue has always had monetary value in Europe, but this was not the case 
in the United States until the 1940’s when organ transplants became widespread.201  
The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)202 makes it illegal to buy or sell human 
organs for transplantation, yet human body tissues are valued as property in other 
contexts, and the sale of blood and semen is permissible.203  Where, then, does 
genetic information fit into this scheme?  One of the major criticisms and fears of 
attributing property rights to genetic information is the potential for creating conflict 
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over ownership rights that could impede research and development efforts and result 
in unnecessary litigation.204  This was one concern of the court in Moore v. Regents 
of the Univ. of California, which held that the doctors/researchers who used John 
Moore’s unique spleen cells without his knowledge or consent for research which led 
to the development of a new cell line were not liable for conversion.205  Instead, the 
court concluded that informed consent was sufficient to protect the patient’s interest 
in knowing what is being done and how his body tissues will be used, without 
creating a property interest in the bodily tissue.206   
The Moore holding is likely good news to the research-oriented, such as 
biotechnology companies, who would have the greatest concern if people were able 
to recover the value of genetic data used for research to produce a marketable 
product.207  Indeed, when New Jersey first introduced its Genetic Privacy Act of 
1996,208 the governor conditionally vetoed the Act, replacing the provision which 
created a property right in genetic information with a privacy right out of similar 
concerns of hindering research.209  While protecting genetic information with a 
privacy interest carries its own criticisms, these have been demonstrated to primarily 
consist of problematic implementation, or non-exhaustive scope of protection.  On 
the other hand, attaching a property right to genetic information may not establish a 
fundamental right, but it does threaten potentially fundamental interests, by possibly 
hindering the steady flow of available raw material, placing the focus on actual 
possession of the information, and complicating the moral nature of the research as 
well as the function of the patent/royalty system.210   
F.  Recommendations 
One method of protecting genetic information is to expand the laws and 
regulations that protect privacy in medical records to include genetic 
discrimination.211  This mechanism would allow legislators to avoid the problems of 
defining what information is considered “genetic” while also avoiding the need to 
find justification for specially protecting genetic information.212  However, this does 
not provide a solution for protecting genetic information in non-medical contexts.213  
In addition, it would not remedy the hodge-podge of state laws and is contrary to a 
uniform scheme.  This is why I urge that federal legislation is the best solution for 
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the sake of uniformity and to prevent an influx into the courts, forcing them to 
attempt to keep up with the scientific research on a case-by-case basis.214 
Rather than attempt to formulate a comprehensive scheme of legislation to cover 
all the threats, federal legislation should be narrowly tailored to the character of the 
genetic information- a concept of separate legislation for separate problems.215  The 
legal theory used to protect the interest at stake could then change depending on the 
context of the use of the information.  However, based on the prevalence of privacy 
theory in state law and the arguments on each side, a property interest would rarely 
be necessary to protect against discrimination or nonconsensual taking or disclosure 
of genetic information.  The laws should directly prohibit undesirable practices 
whenever possible, rather than indirectly create a “privacy” interest which doesn’t 
prevent conditioning employment or insurance on a genetic test.   
New Jersey’s legislation has been hailed as a “model” for genetic discrimination 
legislation.216  Congress could use it for guidance in regard to many issues, because it 
is one of the broadest state measures so far, offering protection on a variety of levels, 
and acknowledging the political, social, and moral significance of genetic 
information, but focusing on health insurance and employment discrimination.217  In 
addition, Congress should not overlook the goals of the ELSI Program funded as part 
of the Human Genome Project to address the implication of genetic research for 
individuals and society.218  With narrow tailoring and careful examination of the 
“real” issues involved, research can continue uninhibited while still protecting 
individual rights. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Fingerprints require only a swirl of ink on paper, to be compared with countless 
other patterns which reveal no more about their source than the appearance of the 
pads of the fingertips.  With the impending completion of the Human Genome 
Project, however, our DNA will provide not only a reliable source of positive 
identification in the form of a “genetic fingerprint,” but also a host of other 
information about the source.  Some do not wish to relinquish this type of 
information without at least the most basic protection against discrimination and 
exclusion from some of the most basic needs in today’s society.219  This writing has 
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not even addressed in detail the additional implications medically, morally and 
socially if genetic information were publicly available. 
The states have made admirable efforts to foresee and prevent the discriminatory 
effects of genetic testing,220 and the federal government has also recognized the need 
and put forth an initial restraint on health insurance group providers.221  The next step 
is to move forward, and continue to legislate before the problem occurs.  A good 
general rule would recognize that there is an individual privacy interest in DNA 
which must be afforded the Constitutional safeguards of due process and a 
heightened scrutiny standard of review for any encroachment on that interest.  If an 
invasion of the protected interest is justified, then the permissible uses of the genetic 
information must be limited to preclude discrimination on that basis with a 
legislative scheme similar to current discrimination legislation.  This will spare the 
courts unnecessary case-by-case adjudication.  Instead, the infant legislation can be 
put to the test, interpreted and adapted to fit the fast-moving legal and social 
developments which are inevitable when science has advanced to the point of 
deciphering the human genetic code. 
KELLY S. ERBES 
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